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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, a major effort has been underway abroad
to modernize the civil justice system of foreign countries by patterning and
effectively exporting the legal devices and strategies of the United States.
Foreign countries, eager to improve upon the perceived inability of some
individuals to obtain legal recourse for certain harms, often look to elements
* Victor E. Schwartz is chairman of the Public Policy Group in the Washington, D.C. office of
the law firm Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. He co-authors the most widely-used torts casebook in
the United States, VICTOR E. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1lth ed. 2005). He has served on the Advisory Committees of the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law (Third) Torts: Products Liability, Apportionment of Liability,
General Principles, and Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm projects. Mr. Schwartz received
his B.A. summa cum laude from Boston University and his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia
University.
** Christopher E. Appel is an associate in the Public Policy Group in the Washington, D.C.
office of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. He received his B.S. from the University of Virginia's
McIntire School of Commerce and his J.D. from Wake Forest University School of Law.
1. This Article was prepared for the Pepperdine Law Review symposium, "Does the World Still
Need United States Tort Law? Or Did it Ever?," which was held April 16, 2010. It is the latest in a
lineage of symposia and articles discussing exportation of United States law to foreign countries.
See, e.g., John C. Reitz, Introduction to the Symposium on Export of the Rule of Law, 13
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. vii (2003); Stephan Landsman, Introduction, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 253 (2002) (introducing the Eighth Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Policy,
"Export/Import: American Civil Justice in a Global Context").
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of the United States tort system as a model.2 Exporting tort law components
of what may be perceived to be a comprehensively-developed and battle-
tested United States system, however, can rarely be accomplished by a
simple "copy and paste" into foreign tort law. The United States tort law
system is comparatively more complex than in other countries, making it
difficult to carve out select, portable pieces. Of equal importance is that
there is no "national" United States tort law, but rather a system of tort
principles developed by courts in different jurisdictions.3 Because of the
often misunderstood complexities of our tort system, the core objectives of
the exported law can become distorted and perhaps even counterproductive
when separated and randomly inserted into a new and different system.
Critical legal concepts run the risk of being lost in translation.4
Equally important from the perspective of a foreign tort law importer is
selecting the most appropriate law to borrow. Incorporating a new law can
be like releasing an animal into a foreign environment; it may find a
sustainable role, or it may dramatically unbalance the existing system. Such
adverse effects are also heightened when a foreign country either seeks to
mimic law that is not fully fleshed out in the United States or fails to account
for subsequent refinement by American courts. Our mistakes and missteps
are then doomed to be repeated. As this Article will show, all of these
mistakes have happened. The fundamental purpose of the Article is to
assure that they do not do so again.
In that regard, this Article approaches the exportation of United States
tort law by exploring three key issues that foreign countries should carefully
consider when deciding whether to import any aspect of the American
system: 1) whether the importer is obtaining the authentic tort or procedural
law product and not an over-simplified or exaggerated version; 2) whether,
if it is the genuine article, the importer accounts for legal developments that
occurred since it was introduced in the United States and learns from our
mistakes; and 3) whether the imported law fits what may be a very different
legal, political, and social culture and is needed to effect the desired change.
To illustrate these issues, this Article discusses four examples of tort and
procedural law concepts exported from the United States.
Part II begins with a discussion of the European Community's ("EC")
adoption of "strict" products liability law and the EC's use of the template
provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Part III addresses, through
2. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376, 390 (Austl.) ("The history of this country and
of the common law makes it inevitable and desirable that the courts of this country will continue to
obtain assistance and guidance from the learning and reasoning of . . . other great common law
courts.").
3. See Guido Calabresi, Remarks ofHon. Guido Calabresi, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 435,
436 (2010) (discussing the wide-ranging values within America and in contrast to Europe, and
concluding that it is "not surprising that we have not had a national tort law in the United States.").
4. See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1225, 1255
(2002) ("Comparative law can be illuminating, but it has many limitations, not the least of which are
the language barriers and prejudices most of us labour under when seeking to learn from the
experience of other systems.").
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Argentina's experience, foreign importation of law providing for punitive
damages. Part IV examines England's contingency or "conditional" fee
system and the influence that litigation financing in the United States had on
that design. Lastly, Part V analyzes foreign importation of class action law,
using Brazil and China as examples.
In each of these examples, the foreign importers either failed to obtain
and pattern the authentic United States law or failed to incorporate later
developments by courts that corrected mistakes or elucidated key legal
concepts. Instead, they adopted a distorted, modified, or incomplete
approach, which may not respond to crucial issues likely to arise or fully
achieve the desired objectives of the new law. These examples serve as a
caution to foreign countries that wine grapes that may thrive in the United
States might wither in a foreign land.
II. EXPORTING "STRICT" PRODUCTS LIABILITY
When the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A was finalized in
1965, it represented a major shift in legal theory regarding the manufacture
and sale of products.5 Until this time, the law in the United States relied
principally on the existence of a contract and express or implied warranties
to permit legal recourse for harms caused by a product.6  Section 402A
abandoned this approach, stating that "[o]ne who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property."
Little case law at the time supported the Second Restatement's
pronouncement of "strict liability" for defective products; it was certainly
not a "restatement" of a clear majority rule.' In fact, section 402A was
drafted three different times.9 When the first draft appeared in 1961, it was
applicable only to food and drink, where some case law support existed.10
The second draft extended section 402A to include products for "intimate
bodily use" in 1962." The Restatement drafters refrained from a more
5. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-The American
Law Institute's Process ofDemocracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 743, 745-46 (1998).
6. See William Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). The case Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83-84
(N.J. 1960), signaled the demise of the privity doctrine.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
8. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 746; John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973).
9. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 746.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6,1961).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962).
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inclusive product approach because a fundamental principle behind
"Restatements" is that they must restate existing case law.12 The Reporters
and advisory committee are not permitted to write their own "tort code," no
matter how compelling; at least a scintilla of existing case law must be the
source of each black letter rule.13
Then, in 1963, one of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Advisors, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, Roger Traynor, wrote
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., giving the Restatement Reporters
the case support they needed to extend strict liability in tort to all products.
Justice Traynor declared that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being." " He then stated that to establish liability, a plaintiff need only prove
that "he was injured while using the [product] in a way it was intended to be
used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was
not aware that made the [product] unsafe for its intended use."' 6 The
Restatement drafters embraced this approach and ushered in a new era of
strict liability in United States tort law.
Meanwhile, the EC, having seen from afar this significant legal
development, and understanding its potential to remediate injured parties
and improve consumer safety, set out to "import" strict products liability to
Europe.' 7  This effort was bolstered by great public support for reform
following linkage of the popular sedative thalidomide to severe birth defects
in tens of thousands of children whose mothers ingested the drug during the
late 1950s and early 1960s." The first major step in designing a product
liability regime occurred in 1976 when the Council of Europe adopted the
Strasbourg Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury
and Death. 9 It was not until 1985, however, that the Council of the
12. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 746.
13. Id. The ALI's purpose is "educational" and includes "promot[ing] the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs . . A.L.I., BYLAWS § 1.01
(1994), reprinted in 74 A.L.I. PROC. 521, 521 (1997).
14. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). Greenman was a case involving a power tool that could be used as
a saw, drill, and wood lathe. The plaintiff was using the tool as a lathe when the piece of wood
being turned suddenly flew out of the machine, struck him on the forehead, and inflicted serious
injuries. See id. at 898. Expert witnesses testified that inadequate set screws were used to hold the
machine together so that normal vibration could cause the lathe to move away from the piece of
wood being turned and "let go" of it. See id. at 899.
15. Id. at 900.
16. Id. at 901.
17. See S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 573, 579-89 (2001) (discussing the modern development of European
products liability law).
18. See Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective
Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REv. 985, 1021 (1998).
Germany, for example, created a special liability regime for medicine in 1976 as a result of the
injuries caused by ingesting thalidomide. See id at 992.
19. See European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, Jan.
27, 1977, 1977 Europa T.S. No. 91 (1977); see also WARREN FREEDMAN, INTERNATIONAL
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European Union adopted Directive 85/374 ("Product Liability Directive"),
governing strict products liability for member countries.20
Despite nearly nine years of debate and refinement, the Product Liability
Directive shares many similarities with the Strasbourg Convention's original
proposal. Both borrowed heavily from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A. The Product Liability Directive, similar to the Strasbourg
Convention's adopted proposal, subjects a producer to strict liability for any
damage caused by a product "defect" 21 and provides that "[a] product is
defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to
expect, taking all circumstances into account." 22  This language closely
tracks the "unreasonably dangerous" provision of section 402A.23
Absent from the Product Liability Directive is recognition of the
subsequent developments in the theory of strict products liability that
occurred between 1965, when Section 402A was finalized, and 1985, when
the Product Liability Directive was adopted.24 While section 402A
generally provides for strict liability in all cases of alleged product defect,
this interpretation evolved significantly in American courts to incorporate
certain fault-based determinations.
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court in Prentis v. Yale
Manufacturing Co. 25 recognized that "strict" products liability did not work
as well with cases based on failure to warn or defective design as it worked
with cases based on mismanufactured products. The court painstakingly
reviewed precedent and demonstrated that, while the term "strict liability"
was sometimes used in design and warning cases, in hindsight, courts did
not apply strict liability in those areas.26 Rather, the analysis undertaken
was based on the fault of the manufacturer. The court also showed that there
were sound public policy reasons not to apply strict liability in an absolute
sense:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 277 (1986).
20. See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (E.C.) [hereinafter Council Directive
85/374].
21. Id., art. 1.
22. Id, art. 6.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
24. See Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union-Not a United States Analog,
5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 341, 344 (2000) ("[A]lthough the doctrine which emerged under the
Directive embodied aspects of Chief Justice Traynor's version of strict liability, it is far from a
mirror image of strict liability in the United States.").
25. 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984).
26. Id. at 182-84 ("Although many courts have insisted that the risk-utility tests they are
applying are not negligence tests . .. [t]he underlying negligence calculus is inescapable." (citations
omitted)).
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[A] fault system incorporates greater intrinsic fairness in that the
careful safety-oriented manufacturer will not bear the burden of
paying for losses caused by the negligent product seller. It will
also follow that the customers of the careful manufacturer will not
through its prices pay for the negligence of the careless. As a final
bonus, the careful manufacturer with fewer claims and lower
insurance premiums may, through lower prices as well as safer
products, attract the customers of less careful competitors.27
Other courts, recognizing that the "strict" liability rule in design and
warning cases was a "paper tiger," restricted its actual application to
mismanufactured products.28
In addition, the drafters of the Product Liability Directive had the
benefit of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act of 1979,29 which
similarly delineates the intrinsic differences in American products liability
for design and warning defects. As the Model Act states, "No court, in spite
of some loose language that has been used, has imposed true strict or
absolute liability on manufacturers for products which are unreasonably
unsafe in design."o With regard to design defects, the Model Act also notes
that "[t]he approach has its roots in the law of negligence and has been put
into modem and appropriate product liability terminology by some courts in
their attempt to resolve the defective design dilemma."31  Likewise, for
defective warnings, the Model Act expressly provides that "[t]he standard is
reasonableness, not absolute or strict liability."3 2
The Product Liability Directive, in comparison, imports only the first
draft of United States "strict" products liability law. The Directive
distinguishes liability for defects in design and "presentation" (i.e.,
warnings), 3 yet provides European courts with little direction as to how the
analysis should proceed or how fault is treated.3 4  As a result, courts-
especially in countries where other factors exist making product liability
27. Id. at 185.
28. See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth,
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 744-53 (1996); see also David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV.
703, 704 (1992) ("From the vantage point of the law's maturity, gained by its awkward, fitful, and
ultimately unsuccessful effort to make sense out of a broad doctrine of strict products liability,
fault's true position at the center of tort law is becoming clearer by the day.").
29. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
30. Id. at 62,723 (citing Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Design: A Proposed
Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 634-35 (1978)).
31. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 99-100 (5th Cir.
1978); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974); Jeng v. Witters,
452 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (M.D. Pa. 1978)).
32. Id. at 62,725.
33. See GERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 37-38 (1993).
34. See Stapleton, supra note 4, at 1228 (noting that the Product Liability Directive is only four
pages in length compared with the 382-page Restatement (Third) of Torts, and that one of the first
cases to apply the Directive was 113 pages as compared with an eight-page case first applying the
Restatement (Third) of Torts).
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cases rare 35 -are more likely to experience confusion or reach a harsh and
unjust decision.36 They lack the benefit of learning from America's tort law
development;37 wisdom which is almost universally accepted by courts
throughout the United States and recognized prominently in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts.38
The example of Europe's importation of American product liability law
is not meant to suggest that the Product Liability Directive is not a
welcomed addition to European law. Rather, it is intended to illustrate how
essential concepts can be lost when using a model law that does not account
for subsequent interpretations by courts and legal scholars, or other
information relevant to the practical use of the borrowed law. To be sure,
the Product Liability Directive includes several important differences from
the United States system, which make the law a better fit for what is a
different litigation culture. 39 For example, the Product Liability Directive
provides several affirmative defenses for producers, including a compliance
with regulatory standards defense, a "state of the art" defense, and a
component parts defense.40 In addition, the Product Liability Directive fits
into the European landscape by not including pain and suffering or punitive
damages, and by having judges, not juries, decide the issues of liability and
damages.41
35. See Geraint Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability and Product Safety-
Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through a Comparison with the
US. Position, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 305, 306 (2000) (noting that in Europe, "[flew European lawyers
can make a living out of products liability and only a few more will ever come across a products
liability case"); Mark A. Behrens & Daniel Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability Law: The
Citadel ofStrict Liability Falls, but Access to Recovery Is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 669 (1996) (discussing cultural barriers as a reason why product liability litigation is
rare in some countries); Li Han, The Product Quality Law in China: A Proper Balance between
Consumers and Producers?, 6 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 1, 16 (2003) (same).
36. See Stapleton, supra note 4, at 1231 (stating "the Directive is one of the high-water marks of
Euro-fudge and textual vagueness"); Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the
Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L.
751, 755 (2003) ("[Comparative products liability] is fraught with dangers of misunderstanding,
lagging behind changes, and getting drowned in detail on the one hand while overgeneralizing on the
other.").
37. Even the European Court of Justice, the highest court in the EU, has criticized the Product
Liability Directive as difficult to interpret. See Case C-300/95, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1997
E.C.R. 1-2649.
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY, § 2 cmt. a (1998) ("In general,
the rationale for imposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing defects
does not apply in the context of imposing liability for defective design and defects based on
inadequate instruction or warning.").
39. See Council Directive 85/374; see also supra note 35.
40. See Council Directive 85/374, art. 7(d)-(f). The Product Liability Directive also provides a
three-year statute of limitations and ten-year statute of repose. See id., arts. 10, 11; see also Geraint
G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 985, 986 (1998).
41. See Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doom & Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC:
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Nevertheless, the EC's delay in enacting a product liability regime may
be in part due to an over-reliance on the United States system and the
Second Restatement as the model to guide it.42 This poses the question of
whether Europe really "needed" United States product liability law, or if it
would have been better served, in terms of expediency and developing a
uniquely European framework, had drafters pursued their own devices rather
than attempt to graft United States product liability law onto a foreign
system and add on distinctly European elements. Other foreign countries
seeking to establish or modify product liability rules can learn from such an
example.43 United States tort law is not a magic bullet, especially when the
imported law is still early in its development, and it can lead foreign
countries down a very different path when subsequent judicial
interpretations are not considered.4
III. EXPORTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A comparatively unique feature of the United States tort law system is
the availability of punitive damages. 45  These damages, also called
exemplary damages, are "damages awarded in addition to actual damages
when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice or deceit; . . . by way of
penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others."46 Punitive
damages have existed in America since its founding and represent an early
import of the common law of Great Britain.47  The availability and
development of punitive damages jurisprudence in the United States,
however, has taken a decidedly different course than in Great Britain.4 8
Today, a majority of the United States allows recovery for punitive damages,
and in greater frequency and amounts than in any other country. 49
Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 TORT & INS.
L.J. 65, 89 (1989) (discussing the impact on damage amounts in Europe by having most judgments
made by three-judge panels).
42. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 581 ("The long delay in adoption may best be explained by
Europe's inclination to look to the [W]est with respect to products liability laws.").
43. See Reimann, supra note 36, at 757-58 (noting that all of Western Europe, most of Eastern
Europe, areas of the Pacific Rim, and Australia have adopted products liability statutes).
44. See Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths ofReform, 34 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 45, 46 (1999) ("Comparative products liability is a dangerous business.").
45. See John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the Tide
Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 508 (2007); see also Reimann, supra note 36, at 786.
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 418 (8th ed. 2004).
47. See Norman T. Braslow, The Recognition and Enforcement of Common Law Punitive
Damages in a Civil Law System: Some Reflections on the Japanese Experience, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 285, 350-51 (1999).
48. See The Right Honourable The Lord Griffiths, M.C., Peter De Val & R.J. Dormer,
Developments In English Product Liability Law: A Comparison with the American System, 62 TUL.
L. REv. 353, 394 (1988) ("In England, awards of punitive damages may be made only in exceptional
cases."). See generally Michael L. Wells, A Common Lawyer's Perspective on the European
Perspective on Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 557 (2010).
49. See Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of Blockbuster Punitive
Damages Awards, 12 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 116, 117-18 (2010); Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
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Most countries do not allow punitive damages of any kind.50 Generally
speaking, punitive damages are more common in countries based upon a
common law system," such as the United States and Great Britain, as
opposed to civil law countries which are based upon a code system.5 2
Nevertheless, in recent years, several civil law countries have looked to the
United States system when contemplating adoption of a new law that would
provide for punitive damages.
In 2008, for example, the civil law country of Argentina adopted a
consumer protection law permitting punitive damages for the first time.53
The law broadly states that if a party fails to comply with a legal or
contractual obligation towards a consumer, a court may award punitive relief
in the form of a civil fine, independent of any other penalties that may
apply. 54
Punitive damages may be applied against offensive conduct in view
of the vicious or malicious motives of the defendant, or because of
the defendant's negligence towards the rights of third parties, taking
into account: the defendant's actions; the nature and extent of the
prejudice or loss which the defendant tried to cause to third parties;
and the defendant's fortune.
In addition, punitive damages can be awarded in cases where public or
collective consumer interests or rights are harmed by a given action. The
Argentine law provides that such damages will be based upon consideration
of multiple factors, including: the behavior and motive of the defendant; the
benefit obtained by the defendant; the economic wealth of the defendant; the
Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposals for
Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1008-10 (1999).
50. See Reimann, supra note 36, at 786. Numerous countries are reluctant to even enforce
foreign judgments of punitive damages. See Braslow, supra note 47, at 285.
51. The common law countries of Ireland, Cyprus, and New Zealand, for example, each allow
punitive damages. See Gotanda, supra note 45, at 511; Thomas Rouhette, The Availability of
Punitive Damages in Europe: Growing Trend or Nonexistent Concept?, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 320, 321
(2007).
52. The civil law countries of South Africa and the Philippines allow for punitive damages. See
Rouhette, supra note 51, at 324.
53. See Law No. 26,361, Apr. 3, 2008, [LIII-D] A.D.L.A 4125 (Arg.) [hereinafter Law No.
26,361]. The incorporation of punitive damages in the Consumer Defense Law was initially
proposed in the project of the Civil Code of 1998. See Agustin Cerolini, The New Argentine
Consumer Defense Law. Punitive Damages: The Main Star, 15 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 437, 439
(2009).
54. See Law No. 26,361, art. 52.
55. Ricardo Richolet III, Argentina-Punitive Damages: Coming Soon to IP Rights Cases?, IP
VALUE 2009: BULDING AND ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUE, 2009, at 80 (bullet
points omitted), available at http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/Article.ashx?g-6al47c3d-clbb-
46d7-9052-50dee553b626.
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social consequences of the defendant's conduct; the possibility that the
defendant's conduct could be repeated in the future if no penalty were
imposed; the nature of the parties' relationship; the possibility of further
penalties, which could turn the punitive damages into an excessive
punishment; the existence of other injured parties who may rightfully claim
damages; and the defendant's attitude after the harm was caused. 56
Such considerations pattern helpful efforts by many American courts to
qualify the definition and purpose of punitive damages.17  Yet, these
qualifications do not address some of the most important and challenging
issues regarding punitive damages. As the experience of the United States
has shown, clear standards are needed for courts to impose punitive damages
in a responsible, consistent, and judicially manageable way. These standards
include a specific standard of conduct (i.e., intentional or reckless behavior),
a clearly defined evidentiary threshold (i.e., clear and convincing evidence),
and limits to the proportionality of the award and number of awards that may
be decided against a defendant, among others.
In the United States, most jurisdictions apply an intentional conduct
standard in order to award punitive damages, and many require clear and
convincing evidence of such conduct.59 Even so, the country has
experienced considerable difficulty reigning in unfair punitive damage
awards that, according to the United States Supreme Court, had by the early
1990s "run wild."60  Such out of control punitive damage awards have
prompted the Supreme Court to weigh in repeatedly on the issue and guide
lower courts as to how these damages must be evaluated.'
Beginning in 1991, the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip first explained that punitive damage awards are subject to
constitutional due process limitations.62 The Court rooted its decision in the
adequacy of procedural protections. It found that the instructions given to
the jury, the post-trial review procedures, and the appellate review
procedures "impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on
the discretion ... [to award] punitive damages."64 In TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that
56. See id at 81.
57. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards:
Turning Compensation Into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REv. 47, 50-52 (2002).
58. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (finding that
an appropriate punitive damage ratio should be single digits).
59. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1992) (requiring proof by clear and convincing
evidence for punitive damage award); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (West 2010) (same).
60. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1990).
61. See Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Christopher E. Appel, The Supreme Court's
Common Law Approach to Excessive Punitive Damage Awards: A Guide for the Development of
State Law, 60 S.C. L. REv. 881, 886-91 (2009).
62. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
63. See id. at 19-22.
64. Id. at 20-22.
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there were substantive due process limits on punitive damages as well. 5
This was followed by Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,66 in which the Court held
that, under procedural due process, states must allow for judicial review of
the size of punitive damages awards. 7 Although the Court's decision
centered on procedural issues, it took the opportunity to reiterate that
punitive damages awards that are so large as to be "grossly excessive" are
unconstitutional.
In 1996, the Court returned to the open question in TXO to provide
guidance on how to determine whether the size of a punitive damage award
falls outside the limits of due process. 69 In BMW of North America v. Gore,
an Alabama jury returned a four million dollar verdict, which was reduced to
two million dollars by the Alabama Supreme Court.70 In that case, the
plaintiff, who purchased a new BMW sedan, suffered $4000 in
compensatory damages related to the unauthorized repainting of his car
during detailing by the distributor. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that the two million dollar award still imposed a punishment that
exceeded Alabama's legitimate interests in protecting the rights of its
citizens because it relied on out-of-state conduct and was, therefore,
unconstitutionally excessive under substantive due process standards.72 The
Court's decision also provided three "guideposts" for determining whether a
punitive damages award is "unconstitutionally excessive."73 These
guideposts include the "degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct;" 74 the ratio of actual damages to punitive damages;75 and a
comparison to "civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
comparable misconduct."76  These guideposts serve both to "prohibit[] a
state from imposing a grossly excessive punishment on a tortfeasor"77 and
ensure that "a person receive[s] fair notice not only of the conduct that will
65. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) ("[Tlhe Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits 'beyond which penalties may not
go.' (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907))).
66. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994).
67. See id. at 432.
68. See id. at 420 ("Our recent cases have recognized that the Constitution imposes a substantive
limit on the size of punitive damages awards.").
69. BMW ofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
70. See id at 565, 567.
71. See id at 563-65. The jury apparently calculated the $4 million punitive damage award by
multiplying the plaintiffs damage estimate ($4000) by 1000, the number of cars BMW allegedly
sold throughout the country under its nondisclosure policy. See id. at 567.
72. See id. at 585-86.
73. See id. at 568, 574-83.
74. Id. at 575.
75. See id. at 580.
76. Id. at 583.
77. Id. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."7 In Cooper Industries, Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc.,
the Supreme Court clarified that American courts must consider all three
Gore factors when reviewing a punitive damages award for excessiveness
and must do so through de novo review.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell-a $145
million punitive damage award stemming from claim of bad faith, fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, all based on State Farm's initial
refusal to settle a case-the Court further refined the Gore factors.80 First,
the Court reminded lower courts that the "most important indicium of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct."8  The Court indicated that juries must be
instructed that they "may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish
a defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it
occurred." 82  The Court also stated that punitive damages may not be
calculated based upon the hypothetical claims of other claimants because
"[p]unishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive
damage awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not
bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains."
In addition, the State Farm Court closely considered the permissible
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages awards. While the Court
declined to create a "bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award
cannot exceed," it indicated that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process."84 The Court noted that, in exceptional cases, a higher
ratio may be justified where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only
a small amount of economic damages."85 The Court, however, observed
that "[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit
of the due process guarantee."86 The Court further reminded lower courts
that the "wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional
punitive damages award," such that it would allow an otherwise
impermissible ratio.87  More recently, the Court in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams ruled that juries can consider harm to others in assessing the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, but courts must adequately
instruct the jury that it cannot punish the defendant specifically for harm
78. Id. at 574.
79. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 440 (2001).
80. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
81. Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
82. Id. at 422.
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id. at 425.
85. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 427.
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done to others.
Argentina's punitive damages law, in comparison, lacks such critical
safeguards. Also, because the law marks the first appearance of punitive
damages in the country, there is no case law which ensures that similar
precautions are taken and that meaningful judicial review is applied. The
law caps a punitive damages award at five million pesos, but contains no
specific standard of conduct, no greater evidentiary showing to make out a
punitive damages claim, and no clear limit to the proportionality of the harm
to the damages or to the number of awards arising out of the same events
that may be decided against a defendant.89  The law also specifically
instructs Argentine courts to take into account the defendant's wealth, which
is something the United States Supreme Court has warned cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.90
Without adequate procedural and substantive standards, such as those
due process safeguards expressed by the United States Supreme Court,
Argentina's punitive damages law risks over-punishing defendants. There
is, for instance, no basic safeguard preventing a court from finding a wealthy
defendant who committed negligence, yet acted with no malicious purpose,
liable for the maximum amount of punitive damages. Similarly, there is no
safeguard to prevent an individual causing 500 pesos worth of harm from
ultimately paying up to five million pesos in damages, a 10,000:1 ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages.
Further, even assuming Argentine courts show restraint and issue only
modest punitive damage awards, the American experience illustrates how
quickly the imposition of punitive damages can escalate. As the United
States Supreme Court recognized, up until the 1960s, "punitive damages
were 'rarely assessed' and usually 'small in amount.'" 9 But by the late
1970s and early 1980s, "unprecedented numbers of punitive awards in
product liability and other mass tort situations began to surface,"92 and the
size of punitive damage awards "increased dramatically." 93 While a number
88. 549 U.S. 346, 356-57 (2007).
89. See Law No. 26,361, art. 47.
90. See id; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427.
91. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1982)); see also RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIvE DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2, at 5 (1991) ("[G]enerally before 1955, even if punitive
damages were awarded, the size of the punitive damage award in relation to the compensatory
damage award was relatively small, as even nominal punitive damages were considered to be
punishment in and of themselves.").
92. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.
REV. 139, 142 (1986); accord Philip Borowsky & Jay Nicolaisen, Punitive Damages in California:
The Integrity of Jury Verdicts, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 147, 148 (1983) (noting trend of "juries ...
award[ing] substantial punitive damages with increasing frequency").
93. George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 123, 123
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of states have, similar to Argentina, placed an upper limit on the amounts of
punitive damages that may be awarded, 94 it has not had the effect of
eliminating disproportionate or excessive awards.
Countries looking to the United States when designing law providing for
punitive damages should exercise considerable caution. A major factor
curbing excessive punitive damage awards in the United States is
constitutional protections, which do not exist to the same extent in many
foreign jurisdictions. For this reason, there is comparatively less statutory
language by which to model a foreign law; the major developments
involving punitive damages come from courts, namely the United States
Supreme Court. This lack of neat and portable model law creates a serious
risk that the foreign importer will neither impose meaningful objective
standards and limits on the amount of punishment nor address the problem
of multiple impositions of punitive damages for the same or similar
conduct. 9 This failure can in turn open the door to unpredictable and
excessive punitive damage awards, repeating the errors of many American
courts.
Moreover, only through a comprehensive understanding of the United
States' constitutional due process protections relevant to punitive damage
awards can a foreign country import the authentic law. Armed with this
knowledge, the importer must then make the informed decision of whether
punitive damages are really "needed" such that the perceived benefits in
terms of punishment and deterrence 9 6 outweigh the risks of unjust
application. 97 In determining whether punitive damages are desirable,
(1982).
94. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(a), (d) (Mitchie, LEXIS through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (allowing
the greater of 3:1 or $1.5 million in most personal injury suits and 3:1 or $500,000 in most other
actions); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f) (2008) (allowing the greater of 3:1 ratio or $500,000 in most
actions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (LEXIS through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (allowing only a
ratio of 1:1); Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.265(1) (LEXIS through 95th Gen. Assembly, first Reg. Sess.
2009) (allowing the greater of 5:1 or $500,000 in most cases); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4)
(LEXIS through 2009 Legis. Sess.) (allowing the greater of 2:1 or $250,000); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.21(D)(2)(a) (LEXIS through 128th Gen. Assembly) (providing a 2:1 ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages in most tort cases); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (LEXIS through Reg.
Sess. 2010) (establishing a $350,000 punitive damages cap).
95. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (holding that a jury may not base
an award of punitive damages upon its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons not before
the court); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Death by a Thousand Cuts: How to Stop Multiple
Imposition ofPunitive Damages, BRIEFLY, Dec. 2003, at 1.
96. See Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured
Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1988).
97. For example, France, another civil law country, is presently deciding whether to authorize
punitive damages. See Pascal Clement, Avant-projet de reforme du droit des obligations (Articles
1101 6 1386 du Code civil), et du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 ai 2281 du Code civil)
[Draft Reform of the Law of Obligations (Articles 1101 to 1386 of the Civil Code) and the Right of
Prescription (Articles 2234 to 2281 of the Civil Code)], art. 1371, at 162 (Sept. 22, 2005) (Fr.),
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/artpix/RAPPORTCATALASEPTEMBRE2005.pdf The most current
draft of Article 1371 imposes a higher "premeditation" conduct standard but does not place any limit
on punitive damages. See Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages-A European Perspective, 68 LA. L.
REV. 741, 750-51 (2008).
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foreign importers should also consider whether existing law, which includes
the criminal law, acts as an adequate deterrent and whether there is
substantial evidence that plaintiffs are unable to recover fairly for harms
such that an auxiliary civil system of monetary penalty is essential.
IV. EXPORTING CONTINGENCY FEES
Beyond borrowing law intended to create new legal remedies (such as
products liability) or to expand the range of available recovery (such as
through adoption of punitive damages), several foreign countries have
looked to the United States to design an improved system for financing
litigation. In particular, a handful of European countries have debated
whether and how the United States' contingency fee system might fare
within their civil justice systems. 98 The American contingency fee system
generally provides that a prevailing attorney is awarded an agreed-upon
percentage of any recovery-for example, one-third of a judgment-but
recoups nothing if the plaintiff loses.99 The debate on whether to allow
contingency fees centers on the fee's potential to improve access to courts
for certain groups of plaintiffs; it is counterbalanced by the potential for
adverse public policy effects, such as inappropriate fee amounts or
encouraging marginal or speculative litigation. 0
In the United States, contingency fee agreements are widely available.
They were once viewed as illegal'o' but gained grudging acceptance in the
late nineteenth century.102 The principal reason for this reversal was the
recognition that contingency fees can have a worthy purpose, namely
providing access to the legal system regardless of a person's ability to
pay.'o3 At the same time, the fees can provide lawyers with legitimate
98. See Reimann, supra note 36, at 823. Forms of contingency fee arrangements presently exist
at least to some extent in Australia, Greece, Finland, Israel, Spain, Korea, South Africa, and some
Canadian provinces. See id
99. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2007).
100. See Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 548 (1999) (stating that in the context of medical malpractice suits, "[I]imiting
contingent fees would reduce frivolous suits and unrealistic settlement demands"); Lester Brickman,
Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REV.
29, 47-48 (1989); Charles E. Hyde, Conditional Versus Contingent Fees: Litigation Expenditure
Incentives, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 180, 181 (2006).
101. See, e.g., Butler v. Legro, 62 N.H. 350, 352 (1882) ("Agreements of this kind are contrary to
public justice and professional duty, tend to extortion and fraud, and are champertous and void.").
102. See, e.g., 33 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 80, 579 (1908) (Canon 13 of the Canons of Ethics, approving
of contingency fees but carefully noting that they "should be under the supervision of the court, in
order that clients may be protected from unjust charges").
103. See Brickman, supra note 100, at 43-44. Contingency fees can benefit society because they
can "provide the only practical means by which one having a claim against another can
economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim. .
. ." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBLITY EC 2-20 (1976) (amended 1980).
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financial incentives to maximize recovery for their private clients, aligning
the goals of the attorney and client and creating a sustainable market for the
fee's use.'0
Although contingency fee agreements are generally accepted in the
United States today, there remain prohibitions based on public policy. For
example, contingency fees are not permitted in criminal defense cases.'s
The bar against contingency fee arrangements in criminal cases exists
because they can create disincentives that threaten to corrupt justice. For
instance, if a lawyer's recovery is based on his or her client's acquittal, the
incentive is to win at any cost, possibly by suborning pejury.10 6 In addition,
contingency fee agreements in divorce cases are facially invalid because
they would discourage reconciliation. 07 In matters of public litigation, such
as claims brought on behalf of a state or local government, the use of
contingency fees may also be prohibited because a private attorney's profit-
maximizing motives can conflict with the interests of achieving justice. 08
The federal government, for example, prohibits financing public litigation on
a contingency fee basis.109
Outside of these specific instances, America's contingency fee system
operates relatively unrestrained. Attorneys are ethically limited on the
reasonableness of the fee they charge, but often there is no bright-line rule
for the maximum percentage contingency fee they may charge or total
amount they may collect from a case." 0 For this reason, contingency fees
have become the preferred method of litigation financing for large
populations of attorneys, most notably personal injury attorneys."' These
attorneys often advertise the opportunity for "no upfront costs" or use the
word "free," and state that they will only receive payment if the plaintiff
prevails. In doing so, they may avail themselves to potential clients who
may not have the financial resources or inclination to rightfully sue.' 12
These attorneys, however, might not disclose in their advertising that costs
104. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 374 n.4 (1996) ("the promise of a contingency fee
should also provide sufficient incentive for counsel to take meritorious cases").
105. See Brickman, supra note 100, at 40-41.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2007) (prohibiting contingency fees
in domestic relations or criminal matters).
108. See Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel, Can Governments Impose a
New Tort Duty To Prevent External Risks? The "No-Fault" Theories Behind Today's High-Stakes
Government Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 923, 931-34 (2009) (discussing public
litigation brought on a contingency fee basis as not being in the public interest).
109. See Exec. Order No. 13,433, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,441 (May 16, 2007).
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2007) (stating that a "lawyer shall not make
an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses,"
and providing factors to determine the reasonableness of a fee).
111. See Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintifs' Bar Bars Plaintiffs, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 345,
350 n.26 (2006-2007) ("virtually all personal injury cases are taken on contingent fees"); Lester
Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 65, 68 (2003) ("Virtually all tort claiming is financed by plaintiff lawyers through
the medium of contingent fees.").
112. See Brickman, supra note 100, at 43-44.
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may be added to the contingency fee and that contingency fees may result in
lesser total recovery for plaintiffs as compared with traditional hourly fee
counsel. Thus, while the contingency fee attorneys may improve access for
the poor to the court system, in some states the lack of regulation and
oversight can leave consumers of legal services with only a "buyer beware"
protection.
In many foreign countries, access to the judiciary is impaired by
political, cultural, and financial barriers. In an effort to at least relax the
financial burden, some countries-most notably England-have looked to
litigation financing in the United States." 3 During the late 1980s and 1990s,
England engaged in a fiery debate over allowing lawyers to enter
contingency fee agreements.114 The end result was authorization of a form
of contingency fee (commonly called the "conditional fee"), which is very
similar to the American approach yet which ultimately furthers a very
different public policy goal.s"5
For centuries, contingency fees were strictly prohibited in England,
much like they were initially in the United States." 6 They were regarded as
a champertous agreement by which an unrelated party obtains a direct
financial stake in a litigant's claim.17 In England, such agreements
constituted a criminal offense and were unenforceable on public policy
grounds." 8  By the 1960s, however, the prosecution of champerty as a
criminal offense had fallen into disuse, prompting some legal authorities,
such as the Law Commission, to conclude that it was "dead letter" in
English law.1" This position was made official by the Criminal Law Act of
1967, which removed criminal and tortious liability for champerty.12 0 Even
so, champertous agreements remained unlawful and unenforceable on public
policy grounds.121 Over the next two decades, England remained committed
to this prohibition on champertous contingency fee agreements. In 1979, for
example, the Royal Commission on Legal Services unanimously rejected
113. See generally Michael Zander, Will the Revolution in the Funding of Civil Litigation in
England Eventually Lead to Contingent Fees?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (2002).
114. See Richard L. Abel, An American Hamburger Stand in St. Paul's Cathedral: Replacing
Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 253,
261-68 (2001); Geoffrey Woodroffe, Loser Pays and Conditional Fees-An English Solution?, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 345, 352-54 (1998); Zander, supra note 113, at 261-64.
115. See Peter Melamed, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee? An Assessment of the Incentive
Effects of the English Conditional Fee Arrangement, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2433 (2006).
116. See Zander, supra note 113, at 259-60.
117. See id.
118. See id; see also Woodroffe, supra note 114, at 349-50.
119. See LAW COMMISSION, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE LAW RELATING TO MAINTENANCE
AND CHAMPERTY, para. 7, at 4 (1966).
120. See Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 14(2) (Eng.).
121. See Zander, supra note 113, at 260.
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contingency fees as a way of financing litigation on the ground that they
would have a corrupting influence on lawyers.122
In 1989, the debate whether to allow contingency fees was reignited by
the Thatcher government's publication of controversial green papers, which
endorsed litigation financing reform more in line with free market ideals and
the United States system. 12 3 This proposal was ultimately incorporated into
the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990, which first authorized the
"conditional fee agreement."1 24  This law generally permits fees to be
contingent upon the outcome of a matter "only in specified circumstances"
and where the agreement complies with any rules imposed by the Lord
Chancellor. 125 It specifically prohibits contingency fee agreements where
the agreement is a "contentious business agreement" as defined under the
1974 Solicitors Act, where the agreement involves representation in a
criminal proceeding and in certain family and domestic matters where public
policy strongly counsels against such a fee arrangement. 12 6 These caveats
closely resemble those of the American system. 127
A key division of England's conditional fee approach under the 1990
law was that a lawyer still could not charge a fee expressed as a percentage
of the damages obtained. Rather, the prevailing attorney could recover an
agreed-upon "uplift" or "success fee" stated as a percentage of the attorney's
normal fee. 12 8  For example, if an attorney won her case and ordinarily
would collect fees of C1000 (including profit), she would, pursuant to a 25%
success fee agreement, be entitled to an additional E250. She could not
contract to take 25% of the final judgment.
Such a stringent fee agreement creates different incentives for attorneys
bringing cases in England. Unlike the American system, in which the
attorney's incentive is to maximize the amount of damages, the primary
motivation under the English system is for the attorney to maximize the
probability of winning the case, regardless of the expected judgment. 129
This can have the positive effect of discouraging attorneys from bringing
false or illegitimate claims. On the other hand, it can discourage attorneys
from bringing riskier claims that are nevertheless meritorious, thereby
defeating the United States' fundamental justification for permitting
122. See 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT, 1979, Cmnd. 7648, at 176.
123. See Abel, supra note 114, at 257-60; Michael Zander, The Thatcher Government's
Onslaught on the Lawyers: Who Won?, 24 INT'L LAW. 753 (1990).
124. See Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 58 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/41/section/58.
125. See id. Section 58(1) of the Courts and Legal Services Act provides that "a conditional fee
agreement .. . shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a conditional fee agreement;
. . ." Id. § 58(1).
126. See id at §§ 58(5), 58A(1).
127. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
128. See ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 907,911 (2003).
129. See Winand Emons, Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees Versus Being Insured by
High Contingent Fees, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 20, 29 (2006); Melamed, supra note 115, at 2435
(noting the "misalignment of interests" that can be created by contingent fees).
568
[Vol. 38: 551, 2011] Exporting United States Tort Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
contingency fees to increase access to the court system.
The English conditional fee system also prioritizes attorney case
selection over judicial access by expressly limiting fee awards. The Courts
and Legal Services Act provided that a maximum permissible level of uplift
or success fee would be set by subsequent legislation.' In 1995,
regulations were passed that limited the amount of a success fee to 100%. "'
Hence, attorneys in England can be rewarded for taking on riskier cases but
not to levels that approach the relatively unrestricted contingency fee awards
of the United States.132
In addition, England's "loser pays" system reinforces the emphasis
placed on attorney case selection. Unlike the United States, in which
attorneys may advertise "no upfront costs" and "no win, no pay," such a
scheme does not truly exist in England because a losing plaintiff must still
pay the defendant's legal costs.'3 3 The losing plaintiff must also typically
pay his own court fees and any expert fees.13 4
The end product in England is, therefore, a system of litigation financing
designed on multiple levels to encourage the filing of cases with a relatively
high chance of success. The system is not designed principally to increase
access to justice, which is the core purpose behind the creation of a
contingency fee system in the United States. By importing a modified
version of American law, England's system may not even further the
objective of improving access to justice.' 35 Indeed, in certain circumstances,
England's contingency fee system may discourage access to the judiciary.
For example, if a plaintiff prevails, but the amount of damages awarded is
small, the attorney's fee plus the uplift may exceed the amount of damages
obtained, resulting in a net loss for the plaintiff.3 6 In contrast, a prevailing
plaintiff under the American system, which ties a contingency fee to the
judgment, will virtually always receive a net positive amount of the
recovery. 37 Such greater uncertainty under England's system provides less
130. See Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 58(4).
131. See Conditional Fee Agreements Order, 1995, S.I. 1995/1674 (repealed by Conditional Fee
Agreements Order, 1998, S.I. 1998/1860, art. 2); Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, 1995,
S.I. 1995/1675 (repealed by Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, 2000, S.I. 2000/692).
132. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
133. See Woodroffe, supra note 114, at 352, 355.
134. See id. at 352.
135. See Evlynne Gilvarry, Society Dismisses "Half-Hearted" No-Win-No-Fee Scheme, L. SoC'Y
GAZETTE, May 12, 1993, at 5 (questioning the English conditional fee system as improving access to
justice); Not So Uplyting, 137 SOLIC. J. 443, 443 (1993) (calling the conditional fee system "a fraud
on the client").
136. See Woodroffe, supra note 114, at 354-55 ("The problem with the new English system is
that if the amount of damages is small, the fee plus the uplift may exceed the amount of damages
obtained.").
137. See id.
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incentive for parties to pursue a claim than in the United States and is,
therefore, less likely to promote access to the court system.
The comparison between the American and English litigation financing
system, as explained in the earlier discussion regarding strict products
liability, is not intended to impose judgment on which system is preferred,
but rather to highlight how relatively minor modifications to borrowed law
can dramatically affect the purpose and use of that law. Both countries'
systems of litigation financing undoubtedly further legitimate goals. That
England retains tighter controls and absolute limits on its contingency fees
reflects a conscious effort to curb frivolous, highly speculative, and abusive
litigation-problems that are viewed by many as very serious in America.'38
England chose a balance in its contingency fee system more likely to ensure
only meritorious cases proceed, even if the system did so by sacrificing
increased access to courts and failing to fully achieve the primary objective
of the American law. This example demonstrates the importance of
identifying the clear objective for the imported law to determine if it is truly
needed in the foreign country, and it can help guide other countries
contemplating adoption of contingency fees.
V. EXPORTING CLASS ACTIONS
A final example of exported United States legal traditions is the class
action. Similar to strict products liability, punitive damages, and
contingency fee agreements, class actions represent a "phenomenon" and a
hallmark of the American civil justice system.139 Over the past two decades,
foreign countries have increasingly examined collective actions. 140  They
have looked to the class action device as a means to protect consumers from
comparatively small harms, which, in the aggregate, amount to substantial
harms, and ensure that wrongdoers do not escape liability and act with
impunity. 4 1 For example, the European Union has recently mulled over the
adoption of United States class actions in multiple contexts.' 42  Thus far,
138. See Abel, supra note 114, at 264 n.55, 57 (citing Lord Benson, The Character of a
Profession, FIN. TIMES, May 31, 1989, at 21; Letters to the Editor, TIMES (London), June 9, 1989;
Poor "Lose Out" in Contingency Fees Lottery, L. Soc'Y GAZETTE, June 7, 1989, at 7).
139. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 301, 308 (2007).
140. See id; Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J.
COMP. L. 311, 312-13 (2003); Note, Class Action Litigation in China, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1523,
1523 (1998) [hereinafter Class Action].
141. See Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J.
141, 142, 144 (2010) (discussing benefits of collective actions).
142. See Tiffany Chieu, Class Actions in the European Union?: Importing Lessons Learned from
the United States' Experience into European Community Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 123, 124-25 (2010); Russell, supra note 141, at 142-43; Christopher Smithka, From
Budapest to Berlin: How Implementing Class Action Lawsuits in the European Union Would
Increase Competition and Strengthen Consumer Confidence, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J. 173, 173-74 (2009);
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L.
REv. 179, 179 (2009).
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however, the reception of class actions in the EU and in other countries has
been modest. Only a few countries, two of which are discussed below, have
incorporated collective actions into their laws. 143  In each, the imported
product is significantly simplified from the American model, and safeguards
on the law's effective use are limited or nonexistent.
The modem class action lawsuit in the United States represents the
culmination of nearly two centuries of legal development. Class action
lawsuits originated at common law in state courts of equity,'" and during
the first half of the nineteenth century, the federal class action evolved out of
gradual changes to federal equity rules.14 5 In 1938, when the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were adopted, combining courts of law and equity into a
single "civil" action, federal class actions were set forth in Rule 23, which
remains the class action rule today.146 Rule 23 was substantially amended in
1966 to, among other things, ensure more adequate procedural safeguards in
class actions. 147 States soon revisited their class action rules to incorporate
standards and safeguards similar to the federal rule.148 Although Rule 23
has undergone modest additional revisions since 1966, the core provisions of
the rule remain unchanged.149  It continues to provide the seminal class
action law of the United States.
Under Rule 23, a class action can only be brought if four requirements
are met. The first requirement, commonly called "numerosity," states that
the proposed class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.' 50 For example, if 500 plaintiffs sought damages against a
common defendant, joinder of each individually represented party in a
combined action might prove overly burdensome such that the dispute
would not be resolved expeditiously. Therefore, class treatment would be
appropriate so long as the other requirements are met.
The second requirement, known as "commonality," provides that a class
action can only be brought where there are questions of law or fact common
143. See Baumgartner, supra note 139, at 308-09.
144. See Arias v. Angelo Dairy, 209 P.3d 923, 934-35 (Cal. 2009) (Werdegar, J., concurring);
Raymond B. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 515, 516
(1974).
145. The oldest predecessor to the class action rule was Equity Rule 48, promulgated in 1833. It
was replaced with Equity Rule 38 in the early twentieth century, and when federal courts merged
their legal and equitable procedural systems in 1938, Equity Rule 38 became Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 10-11 (2000).
146. See id. at 11.
147. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (1966 Amendment).
148. See LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE xi (2000)
("[A]fter the Advisory Committee amended Federal Rule 23 in 1966, many states amended their
class action rules, adopting provisions similar to the revised federal class action rule.").
149. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
150. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
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to the entire class of plaintiffs.' 5 ' Stated plainly, plaintiffs are not permitted
to cobble together similar claims (such as negligence) that are not based on
similar facts, circumstances, and actions taken by a defendant or group of
defendants.
The third requirement, generally referred to as "typicality," states that
the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the
claims or defenses of the class.15 2  An example might be where some
members of a proposed class allege strict liability for a mismanufactured
product, while other members allege deceptive advertising of that product in
violation of consumer protection laws. A class action involving both of
these distinct claims would be inappropriate because neither claim is
representative of the entire class.
The final requirement is adequacy of representation.153  This rule
requires that each member of a proposed class must fairly and adequately
protect and represent the interests of the class.154  Class members cannot
have any conflicts of interest with other members of the class."s5 In
addition, adequacy of representation requires that the counsel representing
the class be experienced with class action litigation and must similarly not
have any conflicts with any class members. 5 6 These basic protections allow
class actions only in carefully drawn circumstances involving similarly
situated parties.
Despite such safeguards, the United States experienced an explosion of
class actions in the 1980s and 1990s. Part of this may have been due to an
under-appreciation by the drafters of Rule 23 of the highly lucrative
potential of prosecuting class actions. Class actions were developed mainly
for civil rights litigants seeking injunctions in discrimination cases;1s7 it was
believed that class actions would rarely, if ever, apply to personal injury
cases such as products liability."' In the 1980s, some plaintiffs' lawyers
tried to persuade judges to expand the use of class actions to mass tort cases,
especially those involving latent injuries allegedly caused by exposure to a
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
153. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 800 (7th ed. 2008).
157. See The Class Action Fairness Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 353 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 60 (statement of
John P. Frank, Partner, Lewis and Roca ("If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of the committee,
the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class
action system which could deal with civil rights and, explicitly, segregation.")). Mr. Frank was a
member of the Civil Procedure Committee when the present Rule 23 was promulgated. See id. at 57.
158. See id. at 60-61. Class action status was disfavored even for simultaneous injury cases such
as airplane crashes or hotel fires. As the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure explained: "A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of
damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways." FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
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product over time.'59  Plaintiffs' lawyers argued that the class action rules
needed broad interpretation; otherwise, mass tort cases could slow or stop
the judicial system in its tracks.160 Some courts subsequently began to bend
or ignore the rules and expand the types of claims they were willing to
certify as class actions.16 This was further compounded by the fact that not
all states had adopted all of the rules and rational limits that are embodied in
the federal rule.
During the 1990s, the dramatic increase in class action filings continued,
primarily in state courts. 162  A survey of Fortune 500 companies, for
instance, found that from 1988 to 1998, class action filings against those
companies increased by 338% in federal courts and by more than 1000% in
state courts. 163 Class action litigation also became increasingly lawyer-
driven, with some attorneys seeking very modest remedies on behalf of their
class "clients." While very modest rewards went to the class action clients,
plaintiffs' attorneys collected millions of dollars in legal fees.' " Some of
the most egregious examples were so-called "coupon" settlements, in which
prevailing class action plaintiffs were awarded a coupon redeemable for all
or a percentage of the very product for which they claimed damages, for
instance a box of cereal 65 or bottled water.166 Again, the attorneys were
awarded millions of dollars in fees. Meanwhile, significant forum shopping
took place as plaintiffs' attorneys used "every trick in the book"'6 1 to hold
huge multi-state litigation in plaintiff-friendly state courts and not in federal
159. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1343, 1356 (1995).
160. See id. at 1358; Victor E. Schwartz, "Class Action" Reform: Endless Clashes of Values or
Constructive Results?, 19 TRIAL DIPL. J. 231, 232 (1996).
161. See Coffee, supra note 159, at 1356-58, 1363-64.
162. See The Federalist Society, Analysis: Class Action Litigation-A Federalist Society Survey,
Part H, 1 CLASS ACTION WATCH, Spring 1999, at 1, 5, http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20070321
classactionl2.pdf; DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE RAND STUDY OF
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 15 (1997).
163. The Federalist Society, supra note 162.
164. See Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor's Clothes of
Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1344 (2005); see also J. Brendan Day, My Lawyer
Went to Court and All I Got Was This Lousy Coupon! The Class Action Fairness Act's Inadequate
Provision for Judicial Scrutiny over Proposed Coupon Settlements, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1085,
1086 (2008) (criticizing the Class Action Fairness Act as not going far enough in procedural
protections for consumers).
165. See Ameet Sachdev, Coupon Awards Reward Whom?, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 2004, at 1
(discussing class action lawsuit against the maker of Cheerios, which alleged that certain pesticides
approved for other grains, but not oats, came into contact with the cereal's oat grains); David Zizzo,
Lawsuit Can Mean Big Bucks for Tiny Tort, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 1995, at 1.
166. See Marguerite Higgins, Class Members Get Little in Suits, WASH. TIMES, July 8, 2004,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jul/8/20040708-121754-4808r/print/.
167. For example, a common practice emerged of naming a nominal local retailer to break up the
total diversity of citizenship rule between plaintiffs and all defendants that is required to bring a case
in federal court.
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courts.
In response to such class action abuses, Congress passed the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).1 68  This law established new
procedural and jurisdictional protections on federal class actions, including
the requirement that the class action consist of at least one hundred plaintiffs
to be certified (i.e., numerosity), greater restrictions on the use of, and fees
collected from, coupon settlements, and easier removal of state class actions
to federal court where, generally speaking, greater protections already
existed. 169 These additional, complimentary safeguards are designed to
permit class actions only where they provide the most efficient and effective
means of dispute resolution, target specific and well-documented abuses,
and prevent "forum-shopping."170
The few foreign countries that have adopted the class action or other
form of collective action have almost universally ignored the safeguards
developed in the United States. Two of these countries, Brazil and China,
allow very different forms of collective action, neither of which retains the
same safeguards to curb abuses that evolved and continue to evolve in the
United States.' 7 ' The very basic and minimal language of these laws
portends a troubling future which repeats America's missteps; it is an issue
that will only become more problematic as these countries contemplate
importation of other characteristics of the American civil justice system.
In 1990, Brazil, a civil law country, enacted the Consumer Code, which
established broad and wide-ranging protections for consumers in the legal
system. 172 In addition to establishing a products liability regime comparable
to that of Europe,77 and consumer protection laws for unfair and deceptive
trade practices,174 the law introduced group actions to Brazil.'7 ' The
Consumer Code states simply that the defense of the interests and rights of
consumers and victims may be exercised either individually or
collectively.176 The law confers standing to sue only upon select groups of
government entities specifically charged with defending the interests at issue
in the case and associations legally constituted for at least a year who
include among their institutional purposes the protection of the interests and
rights at issue."' Individuals, absent very narrow circumstances, are not
168. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1711-15 (2005).
169. See id
170. See Smithka, supra note 142, at 179.
171. See, e.g., Gidi, supra note 140, at 341-43.
172. See C.D.C., Lei No. 8078, de I1 de Setembro de 1990 [hereinafter Consumer Code] (English
translation on file with author); see also Gidi, supra note 140, at 328.
173. See Consumer Code, supra note 172, arts. 10, 12-14; see also Jorge Mosset Iturraspe,
General Trends in South American Product Liability Law: An Overview, 20 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 115, 118-19 (2003).
174. See Consumer Code, supra note 172, arts. 29-41.
175. See id., arts. 81-82; see also Gidi, supra note 140, at 328.
176. See Consumer Code, supra note 172, art. 81.
177. See id., art. 82; see also Gidi, supra note 140, at 366.
574
[Vol. 38: 551, 2011] Exporting United States Tort Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
authorized to pursue a class action.178
The Consumer Code divides the types of rights suitable for class action
treatment into three categories: 1) "diffuse rights" that are indivisible in
nature and may be held by unidentifiable persons; 2) "collective rights"
which are also indivisible, but belong to a more specific group of persons
linked to each other or to the opposing party by a legal relationship; and 3)
"homogeneous individual rights" which are divisible individual rights with a
common origin.'79 These classifications, in effect, determine the procedure
applied to the class action. 80 They share some similarities with the original
1938 version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which categorized class
actions as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" actions; a confounding design
which was dismantled by the 1966 amendments.' 8 '
Beyond these basic rules for standing and the types of actions which
may be brought, class actions in Brazil contain few, if any, procedural
safeguards designed to combat abuse.182  Discounting what might be
considered more common abuses of the American system as, in part, a result
of other uniquely American civil justice system features, there still appears
to be wide latitude for injustice. For example, there is no requirement under
Brazil's law that the lead plaintiff and all members of the class suffer an
actual injury, or any mechanism to assure that consumers' interests are
prioritized over the associations bringing such claims on their behalf.183
Brazil's law also expressly provides that its scope is "trans-substantive,"
meaning that it is available to remedy controversies in environmental,
antitrust, torts, tax, and any other area of the law.184 Nevertheless, there are
no corresponding protections applicable to any of these specific types of
litigation. Even general protections comparable to Rule 23(a)'s
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation, or CAFA, are nonexistent.'85
Less than a year after Brazil's importation of class actions, China,
another civil law country, entered the foray as well through enactment of its
Civil Procedure Law.'8 6  The result was markedly different. The law
178. See Gidi, supra note 140, at 366.
179. See Consumer Code, supra note 172, art. 81. For an in-depth explanation of each type of
right for group action, see Gidi, supra note 140, at 349-60.
180. See Gidi, supra note 140, at 349. The specific procedures are set forth by Brazil's Public
Civil Action Act. See Lei No. 7853 de 1989; Lei No. 7913 de 1989; Lei No. 8069 de 1990.
181. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (1938) (repealed 1966).
182. See Gidi, supra note 140, at 341-43.
183. See id. at 376.
184. See id at 328.
185. See id at 367, 367 n.167.
186. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People's
Republic of China] [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Nat'1 People's
Cong., Apr. 9, 1991), English translation available at http://www.newsgd.com/business/laws/20030
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provides that individuals could join together to pursue claims for harm and
that the adjudication of such claims would be binding on other members of a
class.187  Therefore, unlike Brazil's narrow conception of class actions
brought by consumer-oriented associations, China adopted an approach
closer to the American system in which an individual has standing to sue on
behalf of a class. 188
The China Civil Procedure Law also provides a few important class
action safeguards. First, the law requires that the parties to a joint lawsuit
have "common rights and obligations with respect to the object of action.""
This standard resembles the American requirement under Rule 23 of
commonality and typicalityl 90 and gives Chinese courts a basis to deny class
treatment where plaintiffs or claims are not sufficiently related. Second, the
Civil Procedure Law provides mechanisms to help ensure the adequacy of
class representation.191 It provides that a class action may be initiated by
representative members of the class who are duly elected by the class.192 If
such representatives, or lead plaintiffs, cannot be identified through
selection, they may be decided on by the court through negotiation with the
claimants who have filed the lawsuit.' 93 Further, unlike the American
system in which the class action attorney generally controls the litigation
and makes many of the key decisions, the Chinese law requires any
modification or waiver of claims, or confirmation or compromise by the
representatives, to be approved by the represented class members.' 94
Taken together, the Chinese law contains class action standards
resembling Rule 23(a)'s commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation requirements.' 95 These requirements are not as explicit or as
developed as the American standards but, at the very least, provide Chinese
courts with means to prevent some class action abuses. Brazil, in contrast,
imported class actions from the United States without any meaningful
safeguards, relying instead on very limited standing to bring suit as its main
screen on abuse.
These examples are, again, not to judge the propriety of class action
laws in Brazil, China, or any other country which has opened the door to
such collective action, but rather to show how different countries can import
vastly different versions of the same United States law, neither of which
replicates the authentic or complete version of the American law. The
modified approaches taken exclude safeguards that have evolved in the
5220025.htm.
187. See id., art. 53.
188. See id
189. Id.
190. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
191. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 186, art. 54.
192. See id.
193. See id., arts. 54-55.
194. See id., art. 55.
195. FED R. CIv. P. 23(a).
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United States to protect both plaintiffs and defendants and which have been
instituted as a direct response to specific and well-documented types of
abuse. 196 While the decision of countries such as Brazil and China not to
impose similar class action standards may, in part, reflect a belief that other
cultural and political factors exist which limit the use and potential abuse of
class actions,197 experience shows how quickly circumstances can change.
This is especially true where a country adopts other legal devices that
enhance the attractiveness of class actions, such as punitive damages,
attorney contingency fees, or, as in the case of Brazil, greater opportunity for
individuals to file class actions. Such broader, long-term considerations are
crucial in evaluating the "need" for class action laws or any other potential
import of the American civil justice system. Otherwise, foreign countries,
acting with the best of intentions, may ultimately import the worst elements
of United States law and find themselves facing a litigation crisis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Importing United States tort and procedural law is a task not to be
undertaken lightly by any country. It requires thorough research, careful
evaluation, and meticulous execution to accomplish in a manner in which
the importer obtains not only the correct, authentic version of the American
law, but also learns from the benefits and failures of the tort rule or civil
procedure process in the United States. As the four examples discussed
illustrate, it is often not so easy for foreign nations to obtain the authentic
tort law product. It appears to be even more challenging for government
officials and their advisors to adequately account for material developments
and interpretations by American courts. As a result, foreign importers can
unintentionally worsen their own country's civil justice system. Only
through a faithful evaluation of United States law and of the law's public
policy impacts can a foreign country answer the fundamental question, "Do
we really need United States law?"
196. See supra notes 150-53, 167-70 and accompanying text.
197. See Gidi, supra note 140, at 319 (stating that Brazilian society has "lost hope" in the legal
system); Han, supra note 35, at 16 (discussing cultural barriers to litigation in China); see also Class
Action, supra note 140, at 1535 (discussing "[t]ension between the government policy of increasing
the courts' role in resolving disputes and the numerous barriers to effective use of the courts").
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